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Abstract—Several recent transaction processing applications
provide resilience using blockchain technology. At the core of
such resilient blockchain designs is Byzantine Fault-Tolerant
consensus (BFT), which enables operations during failures and
malicious behavior. Unfortunately, existing BFT protocols seem
unsuitable for high-throughput applications due to their high
computational costs, high communication costs, high client la-
tencies, and/or reliance on twin-paths and clients.
In this paper, we present the Proof-of-Execution consensus
protocol (POE) that alleviates these challenges. At the core of POE
are out-of-order processing and speculative execution, which allow
POE to execute transactions before consensus is reached among
the replicas. With these techniques, POE manages to reduce
the costs of BFT in normal cases, while guaranteeing reliable
consensus for clients in all cases. We envision the use of POE in
high-throughput blockchain systems. To validate this vision, we
implement POE in our efficient RESILIENTDB blockchain fabric
and extensively evaluate POE against several state-of-the-art BFT
protocols. Our evaluation shows that POE achieves up to 80%
more throughput than existing BFT protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of blockchain technology, there is
a renewed interest in distributed consensus. In this paper,
we revisit the age-old problem of designing fast and reliable
Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols [1], [2],
[3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. The goal of any BFT protocol is to order
client requests among a set of replicas, some of which could
be byzantine, such that all good replicas reach agreement on
the order for these client requests.
Despite existence of several modern BFT protocols, a large
set of distributed and blockchain applications [5], [8], [9] still
depend on the classical PBFT protocol [1], even though, PBFT
requires three phases of communication, of which two necessi-
tate quadratic communication. This dependence is partly due to
time-tested safe design of PBFT and due to the limiting designs
of other BFT protocols. ZYZZYVA [2] introduced a twin-path
model where all the replicas follow a fast path until the system
encounters a failure, in which case they switch to the slower
path. First, ZYZZYVA has been proved as unsafe [10], which
led to the design of another twin-path protocol SBFT [4].
Second, the performance of a twin-path protocol relies on the
fast path, which expects no failures. If even one replica fails
or one message gets lost, these protocols have to wait for a
timeout to occur before switching to the slower path, which
degrades their performance. At a closer look, SBFT requires
more phases than PBFT. This occurs because SBFT linearizes
each phase of PBFT through use of threshold signatures.
Existing BFT protocols adhere to a primary-backup model
where one replica is designated as the primary while others act
as backups [1]. When a primary acts malicious, these protocols
provide a view-change protocol that facilitates detection and
replacement of such a primary. HOTSTUFF [3] enables primary
replacement at the end of each consensus. This comes at a cost;
HOTSTUFF requires sequential consensus processing, that is,
each subsequent primary needs to wait for messages from a
quorum of replicas before starting the next consensus. This
sharply reduces throughput as messages can no longer be
processed out-of-order.
In this paper, we introduce the Proof-of-Execution consen-
sus protocol (POE), which achieves consensus in just three
linear phases without relying on a twin-path model. As no
one size fits all systems [11], we believe the design of a BFT
protocol should be independent of the choice of underlying
cryptographic signature scheme. Hence, POE can adapt itself
to both symmetric and asymmetric-cryptographic signature
schemes [12]. To concoct POE, we start with PBFT and
successively add four key ingredients:
(I1) Non-Divergent Speculative Execution. In PBFT,
when the primary replica receives a client request, it forwards
that request to the backups. Each backup on receiving a request
from the primary agrees to support by broadcasting a PREPARE
message. When a replica receives PREPARE message from
the majority of other replicas, it marks itself as prepared
and broadcasts a COMMIT message. Each replica that has
prepared, and receives COMMIT messages from a majority of
other replicas, executes the request.
Evidently, PBFT requires two phases of all-to-all com-
munication. Our first ingredient towards faster consensus is
speculative consensus. In PBFT terminology, POE replicas
execute requests after they get prepared, that is, they do not
broadcast COMMIT messages. This speculative execution is
non-divergent as each replica has a partial guarantee–it has
prepared–prior to execution. Moreover, this non-divergence
guarantee allows POE to escape the twin-path model.
(I2) Safe Rollbacks and Robustness under Failures. In
POE, due to speculative execution, a malicious primary can
ensure only a subset of replicas prepare and execute a request.
Hence, a client may or may not receive a sufficient number
of matching responses. POE ensures that if a client receives
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sufficient responses, then such a request persists in time.
Otherwise, POE permits replicas to rollback their state, if
necessary. Hence, the cornerstone of our correctness is the
client getting a full proof-of-execution from a majority of the
non-faulty replicas.
Protocols like ZYZZYVA and SBFT expect optimism during
their fast path. In ZYZZYVA, when a replica receives a request
from the primary, it executes the request and replies to the
client. In SBFT, replicas avoid execution and reply to a
replica designated as the collector. Hence, the client and the
collector perform the task of ordering in ZYZZYVA and SBFT,
respectively. In these protocols, each client (or collector) waits
for responses from all the replicas. Even one failure causes
these clients (or collectors) to timeout and switch to the slow
path. POE’s property of safe rollbacks helps it sustain failures
and avoids the need of a twin-path model.
(I3) Agnostic Signatures and Linear Communication.
Prior works have shown that the choice of cryptographic sig-
nature scheme can impact the performance of the underlying
system [13], [14]. Hence, we allow replicas to either employ
message authentication codes (MACs) or threshold signatures
(TS) for signing [12]. When few replicas are participating
in consensus (up to 16), then a single phase of all-to-all
communication is inexpensive and using MACs for such setups
can make computations cheap. For larger setups, we follow
the prior works and use TS to split the phase of all-to-all
communication into two linear phases [3], [4].
(I4) Avoid Response Aggregation. In SBFT, once a
replica receives a response from the collector, it executes
the requests, signs the response and sends it to a replica
designated as executor. The task of the executor is to combine
the signatures from majority of the replicas (using threshold
signatures) and broadcast this aggregated signature along with
the response to the client and all the replicas. In POE, we
avoid these additional communications between the replicas.
First, these phases of SBFT are akin to the commit phase of
PBFT. Second, in POE, replicas employ cheaper MACs to sign
and respond directly to the client.
We use Figure 1 to affirm the optimal nature of POE’s
consensus in comparison to other BFT protocols. On examining
recent works, we observed that POE can be employed in:
(i) permissioned blockchain fabrics such as MultiChain [15]
and Hyperledger Fabric [16], (ii) multi-primary meta-protocols
such as MultiBFT [17], (iii) geo-scale consensus protocols
such as GeoBFT [5], and (iii) sharding protocols such as
Caper [8] and SharPer [18]. Notice that at present all these
systems employ PBFT for achieving byzantine fault-tolerance,
which affects their scalability.
In specific, we make the following contributions:
1) We introduce the POE consensus protocol, a novel BFT
protocol that uses non-divergent speculative execution to
reduce a phase from PBFT and ensures safe rollbacks to
avoid twin-path models.
2) POE does not rely on clients, collectors or executors to
achieve a safe and efficient consensus.
Protocol Phases Messages Resilience Requirements
ZYZZYVA 1 O(n) 0 reliable clients and unsafe
POE (our paper) 3 O(3n) f sign. agnostic
PBFT 3 O(n+ 2n2) f
HOTSTUFF-TS 8 O(8n) f Sequential Consensuses
SBFT 5 O(5n) 0 Twin paths
Fig. 1: Comparison of BFT consensus protocols in a system with n
replicas of which f are faulty. The costs given are for the normal-case
behavior with a good primary.
3) POE is signature scheme agnostic and can be made to
employ either MACs or threshold signatures.
4) To guarantee safety and liveness, we introduce a safe
view-change protocol to deal with malicious primaries
in the presence of speculative execution.
5) To validate our vision of using POE in distributed and
blockchain systems, we implement POE and four other
BFT protocols (ZYZZYVA, PBFT, SBFT and HOTSTUFF)
in our efficient RESILIENTDB1 fabric [5], [14].
6) We extensively evaluate POE against other protocols on
a Google Cloud deployment consisting of 91 replicas and
320 k clients under: (i) no failure, (ii) backup failure,
(iii) primary failure, (iv) batching of requests, (v) zero
payload, and (vi) scaling the number of replicas. Further,
to prove the correctness of our results, we also stress
test POE and other protocols in a simulated environment.
Our results show that POE can achieve up to 80% more
throughput than the existing BFT protocols.
II. PROOF-OF-EXECUTION
In POE, the primary replica is responsible for proposing
client transactions to all backup replicas. Each backup replica
speculatively executes the client transactions with the belief
that the primary is behaving correctly. In the normal case,
speculative execution expedites the execution of transactions.
When any malicious behavior is detected, the backups can re-
cover by reverting transactions, which ensures non-divergence
without depending on a twin-path model.
A. System model and notations
Before providing a full description of our POE protocol, we
present the system model we use and the relevant notations.
We model a system as a tuple (R,C), in which R is a set of
replicas that process client requests and C is a set of clients
making requests. We assign each replica R ∈ R a unique
identifier id(R) with 0 ≤ id(R) < |R|. We write F ⊆ R
to denote the set of Byzantine replicas that can behave in
arbitrary, possibly coordinated and malicious, manners. We
write NF = R \F to denote the set of non-faulty replicas in
R. We assume that non-faulty replicas behave in accordance to
the protocol and are deterministic: on identical inputs, all non-
faulty replicas must produce identical outputs. We do not make
any assumptions on clients: all client can be malicious without
affecting POE. We write n = |R|, f = |F|, and nf = |NF| to
denote the number of replicas, faulty replicas, and non-faulty
replicas, respectively. We assume that n > 3f (nf > 2f ).
1RESILIENTDB is open-sourced at https://github.com/resilientdb.
We assume authenticated communication: byzantine repli-
cas are able to impersonate each other, but replicas cannot
impersonate non-faulty replicas. Authenticated communication
is a minimal requirement to deal with Byzantine behavior.
Depending on the type of message, we use message au-
thentication codes (MACs) or threshold signatures (TSs) to
achieve authenticated communication [12]. MACs are based on
symmetric cryptography in which every pair of communicating
nodes has a secret key. We expect non-faulty replicas to
keep their secret keys hidden. TSs are based on asymmetric
cryptography. In specific, each replica holds a distinct private
key, which it can use to create a signature share. Next, one
can produce a valid threshold signature given at least nf
such signature shares (from distinct replicas). We write s〈v〉i
to denote the signature share of the i-th replica for signing
value v. Anyone that receives a set T = {s〈v〉j | j ∈ T ′},
|T ′| = nf , can aggregate T into a single signature 〈v〉. This
digital signature can then be verified using a public key.
We also employ a collision-resistant cryptographic hash
function D(·) that can map an arbitrary value v to a constant-
sized digest D(v) [12]. We assume that it is practically impos-
sible to find another value v′, v 6= v′, such that D(v) = D(v′).
We use notation || to denotes the concatenation of two values.
Next, we define the consensus provided by POE.
Definition 1. Let (R,C) be a system. A single run of any
consensus protocol should satisfy the following requirements:
Termination. Each non-faulty replica executes a transaction.
Non-divergence. All non-faulty replicas execute the same
transaction.
Termination is typically referred to as liveness, whereas non-
divergence is typically referred to as safety. In POE, execution
is speculative: replicas can execute and revert transactions.
To provide safety, POE provides speculative non-divergence
instead of non-divergence:
Speculative non-divergence. If nf − f ≥ f + 1 non-faulty
replicas accept and execute the same transaction T , then
all non-faulty replicas will eventually accept and execute
T (after reverting any other executed transactions).
To provide safety, we do not need any other assumptions
on communication or on the behavior of clients. Due to well-
known impossibility results for asynchronous consensus [19],
we can only provide liveness in periods of reliable bounded-
delay communication during which all messages sent by non-
faulty replicas will arrive at their destination within some
maximum delay.
B. Normal-case algorithm of POE
POE operates in views v = 0, 1, . . . . In view v, replica R
with id(R) = v mod n is elected as the primary. The design
of POE relies on authenticated communication, which can
be provided using MACs or TSs. In Figure 2, we sketch the
normal-case working of POE for both cases. For the sake of
brevity, we will describe POE built on top of TSs, which
results in a protocol with low—linear—message complexity
B
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(a) POE using MACs
B
R2
R1
P
c T
PROPOSE SUPPORT CERTIFY INFORM
(b) POE using TSs.
Fig. 2: Normal-case algorithm of POE: Client c sends its
request containing transaction T to the primary P, which
proposes this request to all replicas. Although replica B is
Byzantine, it fails to affect POE.
in the normal case. The full pseudo-code for this algorithm can
be found in Figure 3. In Appendix A, we detail the minimal
changes to POE necessary when switching to MACs.
Consider a view v with primary P. To request execution of
transaction T , a client c signs transaction T and sends the
signed transaction 〈T 〉c to P. The usage of signatures assures
that malicious primaries cannot forge transactions. To initiate
replication and execution of T as the k-th transaction, the
primary proposes T to all replicas via a PROPOSE message.
After the i-th replica R receives a PROPOSE message m
from P, it checks whether at least nf other replicas received
the same proposal m from primary P. This check assures R that
at least nf − f non-faulty replicas received the same proposal,
which will play a central role in achieving speculative non-
divergence. To perform this check, each replica supports the
first proposal m it receives from the primary by computing
a signature share s〈m〉i and sending a SUPPORT message
containing this share to the primary.
The primary P waits for SUPPORT messages with valid
signature shares from nf distinct replicas, which can then be
aggregated into a single signature 〈m〉. After generating such
a signature, the primary broadcasts this signature to all replicas
via a CERTIFY message.
After a replica R receives a valid CERTIFY message, it view-
commits to T as the k-th transaction in view v. The replica logs
this view-commit decision as VCommitR(〈T 〉c, k, v). After R
view-commits to T , R schedules T for speculative execution
as the k-th transaction of view v. Consequently, T will be
executed by R after all preceding transactions are executed.
We write ExecuteR(〈T 〉c, k, v) to log this execution. After
execution, R informs the client of the order of execution and
of execution result r (if any) via a message INFORM. Client
c considers T successfully executed after it receives identical
INFORM messages from nf distinct replicas. This guarantees
that at least nf − f ≥ f + 1 non-faulty replicas executed T
as the k-th transaction and, due to speculative non-divergence,
that all non-faulty replicas eventually execute T .
If client c does not know the current primary or does not
Client-role (used by client c to request transaction T ) :
1: Send 〈T 〉c to the primary P.
2: Await receipt of messages INFORM(〈T 〉c, v, k, r) from nf replicas.
3: Considers T executed, with result r, as the k-th transaction.
Primary-role (running at the primary P of view v, id(P) = v mod n) :
4: Let view v start after execution of the k-th transaction.
5: event P awaits receipt of message 〈T 〉c from client c do
6: Broadcast PROPOSE(〈T 〉c, v, k) to all replicas.
7: k := k + 1.
8: end event
9: event P receives nf message SUPPORT(s〈h〉i, v, k) such that:
1) each message was sent by a distinct replica, i ∈ {1, n}; and
2) All s〈h〉i in this set can be combined to generate signature 〈h〉.
do
10: Broadcast CERTIFY(〈h〉,v, k) to all replicas.
11: end event
Backup-role (running at every i-th replica R ∈ R.) :
12: event R receives message m := PROPOSE(〈T 〉c, v, k) such that:
1) v is the current view;
2) m is sent by the primary of v; and
3) R did not accept a k-th proposal in v.
do
13: Compute h := D(k||v||〈T 〉c).
14: Compute signature share s〈h〉i.
15: Transmit SUPPORT(s〈h〉i, v, k) to P.
16: end event
17: event R receives messages CERTIFY(〈h〉,v, k) from P such that:
1) R transmitted SUPPORT(s〈h〉i, v, k) to P.
2) 〈h〉 is a valid threshold signature.
do
18: View-commit T , the k-th transaction of v (VCommitR(〈T 〉c, k, v)).
19: end event
20: event R logged VCommitR(〈T 〉c, k, v) and
(k = 0 or R has logged ExecuteR(t′, k − 1, v′)) do
21: Execute T as the k-th transaction of v (ExecuteR(〈T 〉c, k, v)).
22: Let r be the result of execution of T (if there is any result).
23: Send INFORM(D(〈T 〉c), v, k, r) to c.
24: end event
Fig. 3: The normal-case algorithm of POE.
get any timely response for its requests, then it can broadcast
its request 〈T 〉c to all replicas. The non-faulty replicas will
then forward this request to the current primary (if T is not
yet executed) and ensure that the primary initiates successful
proposal of this request in a timely manner.
To prove correctness of POE in all cases, we will need the
following technical safety-related property of view-commits.
Proposition 2. Let Ri, i ∈ {1, 2}, be two non-faulty replicas
that view-committed to 〈Ti〉ci as the k-th transaction of view
v (VCommitR(〈T 〉c, k, v)). If n > 3f , then 〈T1〉c1 = 〈T2〉c2 .
Proof. Replica Ri only view-committed to 〈Ti〉ci after Ri
received certify message CERTIFY(〈h〉, v, k) from the primary
P (Line 17 of Figure 3). This message includes a threshold
signature 〈h〉, whose construction requires signature shares
from a set Si of nf distinct replicas. Let Xi = Si \ F be
the non-faulty replicas in Si. As |Si| = nf and |F| = f , we
have |Xi| ≥ nf − f . The non-faulty replicas in Ti will only
send a single SUPPORT message for the k-th transaction in
view v (Line 12 of Figure 3). If 〈T1〉c1 6= 〈T2〉c2 , then X1
and X2 must not overlap. Hence, |X1 ∪ X2| ≥ 2(nf − f).
As n = nf + f , this simplifies to 3f ≥ n, which contradicts
n > 3f . Hence, we conclude 〈T1〉c1 = 〈T2〉c2 .
We will later use Proposition 2 to show that POE provides
speculative non-divergence. Next, we look at typical cases in
which the normal-case of POE is interrupted:
Example 3. A malicious primary can try to affect POE by
not conforming to the normal-case algorithm in the following
ways:
1) By sending proposals for different transactions to differ-
ent non-faulty replicas. In this case, Proposition 2 guar-
antees that at most a single such proposed transaction
will get view-committed by any non-faulty replica.
2) By keeping some non-faulty replicas in the dark by not
sending proposals to them. In this case, the remaining
non-faulty replicas can still end up view-committing the
transactions as long as at least nf−f non-faulty replicas
receive proposals: the faulty replicas in F can take over
the role of up to f non-faulty replicas left in the dark
(giving the false illusion that the non-faulty replicas in
the dark are malicious).
3) By preventing execution by not proposing a k-th transac-
tion, even though transactions following the k-th trans-
action are being proposed.
We notice that when the network is unreliable and messages
do not get delivered (or not on time), then the behavior of a
non-faulty primary can match that of the malicious primary in
the above example. Indeed, failure of the normal-case of POE
has only two possible causes: faulty primary and unreliable
communication. If communication is unreliable, then there is
no way to guarantee continuous service [19]. Hence, replicas
simply assume failure of the current primary if the normal-
case behavior of POE is interrupted, while the design of POE
guarantees that unreliable communication does not affect the
correctness of POE. To deal with primary failure, each replica
maintains a timer for each request. If the replica’s timer expires
(timeout) and it has not been able to execute the request, it
assumes that the primary is malicious. To deal with such a
failure, replicas will replace the primary. Next, we present the
view-change algorithm that performs primary replacement.
C. The view-change algorithm
If POE observes failure of primary P of view v, then POE
will elect replica P′ with id(P′) = v + 1 mod n as the new
primary, and move to the next view v+1 via the view-change
algorithm. This algorithm consists of three steps.
First, failure of the current primary P needs to be detected
by all non-faulty replicas. Second, all replicas exchange infor-
mation to establish which transactions were included in view v
and which were not. Third, the new primary P′ proposes a new
view. This new view proposal contains a list of the transactions
executed in the previous views (based on the information
exchanged earlier). Finally, if the new view proposal is valid,
then replicas switch to this view; otherwise, replicas detect
BR2
R1
P′
VC-REQUEST
(detection)
VC-REQUEST
(join)
NV-PROPOSE Enter view v + 1
Fig. 4: The current primary B of view v is faulty and needs to
be replaced. The next primary, P′, and the replica R2 detected
this failure first and request view-change via VC-REQUEST
messages. The replica R1 joins these requests.
failure of P′ and initiate a view-change for the next view
(v + 2). The communication of the view-change algorithm of
POE is sketched in Figure 4 and the full pseudo-code of the
algorithm can be found in Figure 5. Next, we discuss each
step in full detail.
1) Failure detection and view-change requests: If a replica
R detects failure of the primary of view v, then it halts
the normal-case algorithm of POE for view v and informs
all other replicas of this failure by requesting a view-
change. The replica R does so by broadcasting a message
VC-REQUEST(v,E), in which E is a summary of all trans-
actions executed by R (Figure 5, Line 1). Note that R logged
every request it executed together with the threshold signature
it received from the primary (Figure 3). Each replica R can
detect the failure of primary in the following two ways:
1) R timeouts while expecting normal-case operations to-
ward executing a client request. E.g., when R forwards
a client request to the current primary, and the current
primary fails to propose this request on time.
2) R receives VC-REQUEST messages indicating that the
primary of v failed from f+1 distinct replicas. As at most
f of these messages can come from faulty replicas, at
least one non-faulty replica must have detected a failure.
In this case, R joins the view-change (Figure 5, Line 8).
2) Proposing the new view: To start view v + 1, the new
primary P′ (with id(P′) = (v + 1) mod n) needs to propose a
new view by determining a valid final list of already-executed
transactions. To do so, P′ waits till it receives sufficient
information. In specific, P′ waits for a set S ⊆ R, |S| ≥ nf ,
of distinct replicas from which P′ received valid VC-REQUEST
messages. An i-th view-change request mi is considered valid
if it includes a consecutive sequence of executed transactions.
Further, for each claimed executed transaction in Ei, there
should be a corresponding threshold signature that guarantees
that mi is valid. Such a set S is guaranteed to exist when
communication is reliable, as all non-faulty replicas will
participate in the view-change algorithm. The new primary
collects the set S of nf valid VC-REQUEST and proposes them
in a new view message NV-PROPOSE to all the replicas.
3) Move to the new view: After a replica R receives
a NV-PROPOSE message containing a new-view proposal
from the new primary P′, R validates the content of this
message. From the set S of VC-REQUEST messages in
vc-request (used by replica R to request view-change) :
1: event R detects failure of the primary do
2: R halts the normal-case algorithm of Figure 3 for view v.
3: if R logged ExecuteR(〈T 〉c, k, w) for any w ≤ v then
4: E := {(CERTIFY(〈h〉,w, k), 〈T 〉c) | ExecuteR(〈T 〉c, k, w)}
where h := D(k||w||〈T 〉c).
5: end if
6: Broadcast VC-REQUEST(v,E) to all replicas.
7: end event
8: event R receives f + 1 messages VC-REQUEST(vi, Ei) such that
1) each message was sent by a distinct replica; and
2) vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ f + 1, is the current view
do
9: R detects failure of the primary (join).
10: end event
On receiving nv-propose (use by replica R) :
11: event R receives nv = NV-PROPOSE(v + 1,m1,m2, ...,mnf ) do
12: if m is a valid new-view proposal (similar to creating NV-PROPOSE)
then
13: Execute transactions proposed for new view (derived from set nv).
14: Rollback any executed transactions not in NV-PROPOSE.
15: Move into view v + 1 with state E′ (see Section II-C3).
16: end if
17: end event
nv-propose (used by replica P′ that will act as the new primary) :
18: event P′ receives nf messages mi = VC-REQUEST(vi, Ei) such that
1) these messages are sent by a set S, |S| = nf , of distinct replicas;
2) for each mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ nf , sent by replica Qi ∈ S, Ei consists of
a consecutive sequence of entries (CERTIFY(〈h〉,v, k), 〈T 〉c);
3) vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ nf , is the current view v; and
4) P′ is the next primary (id(P′) = (v + 1) mod n)
do
19: Broadcast NV-PROPOSE(v + 1,m1,m2, ...,mnf ) to all replicas.
20: end event
Fig. 5: The view-change algorithm of POE.
the new-view proposal, R chooses the longest consecutive
sequence of requests E′ and the sequence number kmax
of the last transaction in E′. Then, R view-commits and
executes all requests in E′ as the transactions that happened
before view v + 1. Notice that replica R can skip execution
of any transaction in E′ it already executed. If R executed
transactions not in E′ before the view-change, then R needs
to rollback these transactions before it can proceed executing
requests in view v + 1. After these steps, R can switch to
the new view v + 1. In the new view, the new primary P′
proposes requests with sequence numbers starting at kmax+1.
D. Correctness of POE
First, we show that the normal-case algorithm of POE pro-
vides non-divergent speculative consensus when the primary
is non-faulty and communication is reliable.
Theorem 4. Consider a system in view v, in which the first
k− 1 transactions have been executed by all non-faulty repli-
cas, in which the primary is non-faulty, and communication is
reliable. If the primary received 〈T 〉c, then the primary can
use the algorithm in Figure 3 to ensure that
1) there is non-divergent execution of T ;
2) c considers T executed as the k-th transaction; and
3) c learns the result of executing T (if any),
this independent of any malicious behavior by faulty replicas.
Proof. Each non-faulty primary would follow the algorithm of
POE described in Figure 3 and send the PROPOSE(〈T 〉c, v, k)
to all replicas (Line 6). In response, all nf non-faulty replicas
will compute a signature share and send a SUPPORT message
to the primary (Line 15). Consequently, the primary will
receive signature shares from nf replicas and will combine
them to generate a threshold signature 〈h〉. The primary
will include this signature 〈h〉 in a CERTIFY message and
broadcast it to all replicas. Each replica will successfully
verify 〈h〉 and will view-commit to T (Line 17). As the
first k − 1 transactions have already been executed, every
non-faulty replica will execute T . As all non-faulty replicas
behave deterministically, execution will yield the same result
r (if any) across all non-faulty replicas. Hence, when the non-
faulty replicas inform c, they do so by all sending identical
messages INFORM(D(〈T 〉c), v, k, r) to c (Line 20–Line 23). As
all nf non-faulty replicas executed T , we have non-divergent
execution. Finally, as there are at most f faulty replicas,
the faulty replicas can only forge up to f invalid INFORM
messages. Consequently, the client c will only receive the
message INFORM(D(〈T 〉c), v, k, r) from at least nf distinct
replicas, and will conclude that T is executed yielding result
r (Line 3).
At the core of the correctness of POE, under all conditions,
is that no replica will rollback client requests 〈T 〉c that are
considered executed by client c. We prove this next:
Proposition 5. Let 〈T 〉c be a client request that c considers
executed as the k-th transaction of view v. If n > 3f , then
every non-faulty replica that switches to a view v′ > v will
execute T as the k-th transaction of view v.
Proof. Client c considers 〈T 〉c executed as the k-th transaction
of view v when it received identical INFORM-messages for T
from a set A of |A| = nf distinct replicas (Figure 3, Line 3).
Let B = A \ F be the set of non-faulty replicas in A.
Now consider a non-faulty replica R that switches to view
v′ > v. Before doing so, R must have received a valid proposal
m = NV-PROPOSE(v′,m1, ...,mnf ) from the primary of view
v′. Let C be the set of nf distinct replicas that provided
messages m1, . . . ,mnf and let D = C \ F be the set of
non-faulty replicas in C. As |F| = f and n > 3f , we have
|B| ≥ nf − f , |D| ≥ nf − f , and 2(nf − f) > nf . Hence,
|B ∩ D| ≥ 1, implying that there exists a non-faulty replica
Q ∈ (B ∩D) that executed 〈T 〉c, informed c, and requested a
view-change. Hence, we conclude that the new-view proposal
m must contain 〈T 〉c.
To complete the proof, we need to show that 〈T 〉c is part of
the message mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ nf , with the longest consecutive
sequence of executed transactions. As some messages will
contain 〈T 〉c, mi can only have the longest consecutive
sequence of executed transactions while not containing 〈T 〉c
if it holds an entry (CERTIFY(〈hw〉,w, k), 〈Tw〉cw) such that
〈Tw〉cw 6= 〈T 〉c. Due to Proposition 2, we must have w 6= v.
Without loss of generality, we can assume w > v. As
faulty replicas can only forge f signature shares, there must
be a set E of nf − f non-faulty replicas that contributed
to CERTIFY(〈hw〉,w, k). Each of these replicas must have
entered view w after processing some new-view proposal
m′. As shown above, m′ must contain 〈T 〉c. Consequently,
the replicas in E only support proposals in view w with
sequence numbers larger than k. Hence, we conclude that
entry (CERTIFY(〈hw〉,w, k), 〈Tw〉cw) cannot exist, and that
〈T 〉c will be executed by R upon entering view v′
As a direct consequence of the above, we have
Corollary 6 (Safety of POE). POE provides speculative non-
divergence if n > 3f .
The view-change algorithm of Section II-C will send very
large messages if many transactions have already been pro-
posed. To limit the size of these messages and to deal with
minor malicious behavior (e.g., replicas left in the dark), we
utilize a standard periodic checkpoint protocol to exchange
state information outside of the scope of the view-change
algorithm (see, e.g., [13]). With these checkpoints in place,
the view-change algorithm only needs to exchange information
on transactions proposed after the last checkpoint. Finally,
utilizing the view-change algorithm and checkpoints, we prove
Theorem 7 (Liveness of POE). POE provides termination in
periods of reliable bounded-delay communication if n > 3f .
Proof. When the primary is non-faulty, Theorem 4 guaran-
tees termination as replicas continuously accept and execute
requests. If the primary is byzantine and fails to guaran-
tee termination for at most f non-faulty replicas, then the
checkpoint algorithm will assure termination of these non-
faulty replicas. Finally, if the primary is byzantine and fails
to guarantee termination for at least f +1 non-faulty replicas,
then it will be replaced using the view-change algorithm. For
the view-change process, each replica will start with a timeout
δ and double this timeout after each view-change (exponential
backoff). When communication becomes reliable, exponential
backoff guarantees that all replicas will eventually view-
change to the same view at the same time. After this point,
a non-faulty replica will become primary in at most f view-
changes, after which Theorem 4 guarantees termination.
E. Fine-tuning and optimizations
To keep presentation simple, we did not include the follow-
ing optimizations in the protocol description:
1) To reach nf signature shares, the primary can generate
one itself. Hence, it only needs nf−1 shares of other replicas.
2) The PROPOSE, SUPPORT, INFORM, and NV-PROPOSE
messages are not forwarded and only need MACs to provide
message authentication. The CERTIFY messages need not be
signed, as tampering them would invalidate the threshold
signature. The VC-REQUEST messages need to be signed, as
they need to be forwarded without tampering.
F. Out-of-Order Message Processing
Single-primary protocols like PBFT, SBFT, and POE, offer
a unique opportunity of pipelining and parallelizing multiple
PROPOSE messages. In these protocols, the primary replica
need not wait for one consensus to finish before starting the
consensus for next request. This allows replicas to process
messages out-of-order while they continue executing transac-
tions in the sequence-order. For example, PBFT allows such
an optimization by defining an active-set of sequence numbers
bounded by high-watermark and low-watermark [1], [20].
These watermarks are increased as the system progresses.
In case of POE, notice that a backup replica only accepts k-
th proposal from the primary if it had not previously supported
another k-th proposal (Figure 3, Line 12). Further, a replica
only executes a k-th request if it has executed requests for all
the previous rounds (Figure 3, Line 20). Hence, the primary
need not wait for the consensus of k-th request to complete
before sending out PROPOSE message for (k + 1)-th request.
In case of rotating primary protocols such as HOTSTUFF, this
out-of-ordering is not feasible. We illustrate this in more detail
in Section IV-A.
III. IMPLEMENTATION ON RESILIENTDB FABRIC
To extensively evaluate our POE consensus protocol, we
implemented it in our RESILIENTDB permissioned blockchain
fabric [5], [14]. RESILIENTDB is a high-throughput permis-
sioned blockchain fabric that helps us to realize the following
goals: (i) implement and test different consensus protocols;
(ii) balance the tasks done by a replica through a a parallel
pipelined architecture; (iii) minimize the cost of consensus
through batching client transactions; and (iv) enable use of a
secure and efficient ledger.
RESILIENTDB lays down a client-server architecture where
clients send their transactions to servers for processing. We use
Figure 6 to illustrate the multi-threaded pipelined architecture
associated with each replica. At each replica, we spawn
multiple input and output threads for communicating with the
network. Input threads also authenticate incoming messages.
Batching. During our formal description, for the sake of
explanation, we assumed that the PROPOSE message from
the primary includes a single client request. Existing BFT
protocols allow consensus on multiple requests at the same
time by aggregating those requests in a single batch [1], [2],
[4], [14]. Batching client requests helps to reduce the amount
of communication. Hence, POE also employs batching at both
replicas and clients.
At the primary replica, we spawn multiple batch-threads
that aggregate clients requests into a batch. The input-threads
at primary receive client requests, assign them a sequence
number and enqueue these requests in the batch-queue. In
RESILIENTDB, all the batch-threads share a common lock-
free queue. When a client request is available, the batch-thread
dequeues the request, and continues adding it to an existing
batch until the batch has reached a pre-defined size. Next, it
constructs a PROPOSE message and enqueues this message
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Fig. 6: Multi-threaded Pipelines at different replicas.
in the output-queue. Each batching-thread also hashes the
requests in a batch to create a unique digest.
The primary replica also receives SUPPORT messages from
backup replicas. In such cases, its input-thread enqueues
that SUPPORT message in the work-queue. Each work-queue
is accessed by a single worker-thread, which waits for nf
SUPPORT messages to generate a threshold signature. Next,
it places this threshold signature in a CERTIFY messages,
enqueues it in the output-queue and informs the execute-
thread that the corresponding batch of requests are ready for
execution.
Similarly, the input-thread at a backup replica may receive
PROPOSE or CERTIFY messages from the primary. In such
cases, it enqueues those message in the work-queue. Note
that in response to a PROPOSE message, the worker-thread
at a backup needs to compute a threshold share and send a
SUPPORT message to the primary.
Execution: At each replica we also have an execute-thread
that executes all the requests in accordance with the normal
case algorithm. Once the execution is complete, the execution-
thread creates an INFORM message and places it in the output-
queue for the output-thread to send it to the client.
A. Ledger Management.
We now explain how our we efficiently maintain a
blockchain ledger across different replicas. A blockchain is an
immutable ledger, where blocks are chained as a linked-list.
An i-th block can be represented as Bi := {k, d, v,H(Bi−1)},
in which k is the sequence number of the client request, d
the digest of the request, v the view number, and H(Bi−1)
the hash of the previous block. In RESILIENTDB, prior to
any consensus, we require the first primary replica to create
a genesis block [21]. Genesis block acts as the first block in
the blockchain and contains some basic data. We use the hash
of the identity of the initial primary, as this information is
available to each participating replicas (eliminating the need
for any extra communication to exchange this block).
After the genesis block, each replica can independently
create the next block in the blockchain. As stated above, each
block corresponds to some batch of transactions. A block is
only created by the execute-thread once it completes executing
a batch of transactions. To create a block, the execute-thread
hashes the previous block in the blockchain and creates a new
block. These hashes can be computationally expensive. Hence,
an alternative approach is to store the proof-of-accepting the
k-th request in the k-th block. In POE, such a proof includes
the threshold signature (combination of nf threshold shares)
sent by the primary as part of the CERTIFY message.
IV. EVALUATION
We now extensively evaluate our POE consensus protocol
on our RESILIENTDB permissioned blockchain fabric [5],
[14]. There are many BFT protocols we could compare with.
Hence, we pick a representative sample of four state-of-the-
art BFT protocols to evaluate POE against: (1) ZYZZYVA—
as it has the absolute minimal cost in the fault-free case,
(2) PBFT—as it is a common baseline (design based on
BFTSmart), (3) SBFT—as it is a safer variation of ZYZZYVA,
and (3) HOTSTUFF—as it is a linear-communication protocol
that adopts the notion of rotating leaders. The goal of our
experiments is to answer the following questions:
(Q1) How does POE fare in comparison to the other protocols,
under failures?
(Q2) Does POE benefits from batching client requests?
(Q3) How does POE perform under zero payload?
(Q4) How scalable is POE on increasing the number of replicas
participating in the consensus, in the normal-case?
Setup. We employ Google Cloud to run our experiments.
We deploy replicas on c2 machines with a 16-core Intel
Xeon Cascade Lake CPU running at 3.8GHz and with 32GB
memory. We deploy up to 320 k clients on 16 machines. We
run each experiment for 180 s: the first 60 s are warmup, and
measurement results are collected over the next 120 s. We
average our results over three runs.
Configuration and Benchmarking. For evaluating the pro-
tocols, we employed YCSB [22] from Blockbench’s macro
benchmarks [23]. Each client request queries a YCSB table
that holds half a million active records. We require 90% of
the requests to be write queries. Prior to the experiments,
each replica is initialized with an identical copy of the YCSB
table. The client requests generated by YCSB follow a Zipfian
distribution and are heavily skewed (skew factor 0.9).
Unless explicitly stated, we use the following configuration
for all the experiments. We perform scaling experiments by
varying replicas from 4 to 91. We divide our experiments in
two dimensions: (1) Zero Payload or Standard Payload, and
(2) Failures or Non-Failures.
We employ batching with a batch size of 100. Under Zero
Payload conditions, although all replicas execute 100 dummy
instructions, primary does not actually send a batch of 100
requests. Under Standard Payload, with a batch size of 100, the
size of PROPOSE message is 5400B, of RESPONSE message
is 1748B, and of other messages is around 250B.
For experiments with failures, we force one backup replica
to crash. Additionally, we present an experiment that illustrates
the effect of primary failure. We measure throughput as
transactions executed per second. We measure latency as the
time from when the client sends a request to the time when
the client receives a response.
A. Other protocols:
We also implement PBFT, ZYZZYVA, SBFT and HOT-
STUFF in our RESILIENTDB fabric. PBFT requires three
phases (preprepare-prepare-commit) to achieve consensus.
The client waits for only f + 1 responses before marking
the request complete. Note that our implementation of PBFT
is based on the BFTSmart [24] framework with the added
benefits of pipelining and multi-threading of RESILIENTDB.
Both ZYZZYVA and SBFT follow a twin path model. In
ZYZZYVA’s fast path, replicas execute the client query and
reply to the client. The client waits for responses from all
n replicas before marking the request complete. In case the
client does not receive n responses, it timeouts and sends a
message to all the replicas, after which an expensive client-
dependent view-change and recovery protocol (slow path) is
used to figure out the correct outcome. In both PBFT and
ZYZZYVA, DS are used for authenticating messages sent by
the clients while MAC are used for other messages.
In SBFT’s fast path, replicas require two additional linear
phases than POE. Like POE, replicas execute the request when
they receive a CERTIFY message from a collector. However,
instead of sending their response (r) to the client, they generate
a second threshold share (s〈δ〉i) and send these to an executor.
The executor waits for f+1 identical responses and combines
them into threshold signature 〈δ〉. Next, it sends this 〈δ〉 to all
the replicas and clients. For SBFT’s fast path to work as stated,
either there should be no failures or at least 3f+2c+1 replicas
should participate in consensus where only c > 0 replicas can
crash-fail (no byzantine failures). Moreover, the primary can
act as both collector and executor but SBFT suggests using
distinct replicas in fast path. If the collector timeouts waiting
for threshold shares from 3f + c+1 replicas, then it switches
to the slow path, which requires two additional linear phases.
In any primary-backup BFT protocol, if the primary acts
malicious, then the protocols employ the accompanying view-
change algorithm to detect and replace the malicious primary.
This view-change algorithm leads to a momentary disruption
in system throughput until the resumption of service.
HOTSTUFF proposes eliminating the dependence of a BFT
consensus protocol from one primary by replacing primary
at the end of every consensus. Although this rotating leader
design escapes the cost of a view-change protocol, it enforces
an implicit sequential paradigm. Each primary needs to wait
for its turn before it can propose a new request.
In HOTSTUFF, in round i, the replica with identifier i mod
n acts as the primary and proposes a request to all the replicas.
Each replica on receiving this request, creates a threshold share
s〈h〉i and sends to the replica R with identifier (i+1) mod n.
If R receives threshold shares from n − f replicas, then it
combines them into a threshold signature 〈h〉 and initiates the
consensus for round i+ 1 by broadcasting its proposal along
with 〈h〉. Notice that replicas have not executed the request
and replied to the client. HOTSTUFF’s aim is to linearize
the consensus proposed by the PBFT protocol, which it does
by splitting each phase of PBFT into two using threshold
signatures. To reduce the communication, it chains the phases.
Hence, a replica executes the request for the i-th round once
it receives a threshold signature from the primary of (i+3)-th
round. Evidently, chaining helps HOTSTUFF to some extent
but it does not eliminate its sequential nature. This sequential
nature forces HOTSTUFF to loose out on an opportunity to
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Fig. 7: Upper bound on performance when primary only replies to
clients (no exec.) and when primary executes a request and replies
to clients (exec.).
process messages out-of-order.
B. System Characterization
We first determine the upper bounds on the performance
of RESILIENTDB. In Figure 7, we present the maximum
throughput and latency of RESILIENTDB when there is no
communication among the replicas. We use the term No
Execution to refer to the case where all the clients send their
request to the primary replica and primary simply responds
back to the client. We count every query responded back in
the system throughput. We use the term Execution to refer to
the case where the primary replica executes each query before
responding back to the client. In these experiments, we allow
two threads to work independently at the primary replica and
no ordering on the queries is maintained. Our results indicate
that the system can attain high throughputs (up to 500 ktxn/s)
and can reach low latencies (up to 0.25 s).
Notice that if we employ additional worker-threads to
process requests, then our RESILIENTDB fabric can easily
attain higher throughput. However, while modeling consensus
protocols in our RESILIENTDB fabric (refer to Figure 6), we
allowed running only one worker-thread. Hence, we bound the
system performance with two parallel worker-threads.
C. Effect of Cryptographic Signatures.
RESILIENTDB enables a flexible design where replicas and
clients can employ both digital signatures (threshold signa-
tures) and message authentication codes. This helps us to im-
plement POE and other consensus protocols in RESILIENTDB.
To achieve authenticated communication using symmet-
ric cryptography, we employ a combination of CMAC and
AES [12]. Further, we employ ED25519-based digital signa-
tures to enable asymmetric cryptographic signing. For generat-
ing efficient threshold signature scheme, we use Boneh–Lynn–
Shacham (BLS) signatures [12]. To create message digests and
for hashing purposes, we use the SHA256 algorithm.
Next, we determine the cost of different cryptographic
signing schemes. For this purpose, we run three different
experiments in which (i) no signature scheme is used (None);
(ii) everyone uses digital signatures based on ED25519 (ED);
and (iii) all replicas use CMAC+AES for signing, while clients
sign their message using ED25519 (CMAC). In these three
experiments, we run PBFT consensus among 16 replicas. In
Figure 8, we illustrate the throughput attained and latency
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Fig. 8: System performance using three different signature schemes.
In all cases, n = 16 replicas participate in consensus.
incurred by RESILIENTDB for the experiments. Clearly, the
system attains highest throughput when no signatures are
employed. However, such a system cannot handle malicious
attacks. Further, using just digital signatures for signing mes-
sages can prove to be expensive. An optimal configuration can
require clients to sign their messages using digital signatures,
while replicas can communicate using MACs.
D. Scaling Replicas under Standard Payload
In this section, we evaluate scalability of POE both under
backup failure and no failures.
(1) Single Backup Failure. We use Figures 9(a) and 9(b) to
illustrate the throughput and latency attained by the system on
running different consensus protocols under a backup failure.
These graphs affirm our claim that POE attains higher through-
put and incurs lower latency than all the other protocols.
In case of PBFT, each replica participates in two phases
of quadratic communication, which leads to reduction in its
throughput. For the twin-path protocols such as ZYZZYVA
and SBFT, a single failure is sufficient to cause massive
reductions in their system throughputs. Notice that in SBFT
and ZYZZYVA, the collector and clients have to wait for mes-
sages from all the n replicas, respectively. First, predicting an
optimal value for timeout is hard [25], [26]. Hence, we chose
a very small value for timeout (3s) for replicas and clients.
We justify these values through the experiments we show later
in this section where average latency can be as large as 6s.
But, why does timeout affects ZYZZYVA more than SBFT?
In case of ZYZZYVA, as clients are waiting for timeouts, so
they stop sending requests, which empties the pipeline at the
primary and has no new request to propose. In case of SBFT,
the collector may timeout waiting for threshold shares for k-th
round while primary continues proposing requests for round
l, l > k. Hence, replicas have more opportunity to occupy
themselves with useful work.
So can ZYZZYVA perform any better in real-world deploy-
ments? Yes, prior to running each consensus if every client
can precisely predict the latency, then a client needs to wait
for only that much time before it timeouts. First, this is hard.
Second, say clients successfully predict the expected latency.
Now, if even one message faces a slight delay, then clients
will end up running the expensive slow path.
HOTSTUFF attains significantly low throughput due to its
sequential model. Although HOTSTUFF pipelines phases of the
protocol, each of its primary has to wait before proposing the
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Fig. 9: Evaluating system throughput and average latency incurred by POE and other BFT protocols.
next request, which leads to reduction in its throughput. Inter-
estingly, HOTSTUFF incurs the least average latency among
all the protocols. This is a result of intensive load on the
system when running other protocols. As these protocols pro-
cess several requests concurrently (refer to the multi-threaded
architecture in Appendix III), these requests have to spend on
an average more time in the queue before being processed by
a replica. Notice that all the single primary protocols employ
this trade off: a small sacrifice on latency yields higher gains
on system throughput.
In case of POE, its high throughputs under failures is a
result of its three-phase linear protocol that does not rely on
any twin-path model. To summarize, POE attains up to 43%,
72%, 24× and 62× more throughputs than PBFT, SBFT,
HOTSTUFF and ZYZZYVA.
(2) No Replica Failure. We use Figures 9(c) and 9(d) to
illustrate the throughput and latency attained by the system on
running different consensus protocols in fault-free conditions.
These plots help us to bound the maximum throughput that
can be attained by different consensus protocols in our system.
First, as expected, in comparison to the Figures 9(a)
and 9(b), the throughputs for POE and PBFT are slightly
higher. Second, POE continues to outperform both PBFT and
HOTSTUFF, for the reasons described earlier. Third, both
ZYZZYVA and SBFT are now attaining higher throughputs as
their clients and collector no longer timeout, respectively. The
key reason SBFT’s gains are limited is because SBFT requires
five phases and becomes computation bounded. Although
PBFT is quadratic, it employs MAC, which are cheaper to sign
and verify.
Notice that the differences in throughputs of POE and
ZYZZYVA are small. POE has 20% (on 91 replicas) to 13%
(on 4 replicas) less throughputs than ZYZZYVA. An interesting
observation is that on 91 replicas, ZYZZYVA incurs almost the
same latency as POE, even though it has higher throughput.
This happens as clients in POE have to wait for only the fastest
nf = 61 replies, whereas a client for ZYZZYVA has to wait for
replies from all replicas (even the slowest ones). To conclude,
POE attains up to 35%, 27% and 21× more throughput than
PBFT, SBFT and HOTSTUFF, respectively.
E. Scaling Replicas under Zero Payload
We now measure the performance of different protocols
under zero payload. In any BFT protocol, the primary starts
consensus by sending a PRE-PREPARE message that includes
all the transactions. As a result, this message has the largest
size and is responsible for consuming majority of the band-
width. A zero payload experiment ensures that each replica
executes dummy instructions. Hence, the primary is no longer
a bottleneck.
We again run these experiments for both Single Failure and
Failure-Free cases, and use Figures 9(e) to 9(h) to illustrate
our observations. It is evident from these figures that zero
payload experiments have helped in increasing POE’s gains.
POE attains up to 85%, 62% and 27× more throughputs
than PBFT, SBFT and HOTSTUFF, respectively. In fact, under
failure-free conditions, the throughput attained by POE is
comparable to ZYZZYVA. Why is this the case? First, both
POE and ZYZZYVA are linear protocols. Second, although in
failure-free cases ZYZZYVA attains consensus in one phase,
its clients need to wait for response from all the n replicas,
which gives POE an opportunity to cover the gap. However,
SBFT being a linear protocol does not perform as good as
its other linear counterparts. Its throughput is impacted by the
delay of five phases.
F. Impact of Batching under Failures
The next key question we ask is: how much does POE
benefit from batching client requests when the system faces
a replica failure? To answer this question, we measure per-
formance as function of the number of requests in a batch
(the batch-size), which we vary between 10 and 400. For this
experiment, we use a system with 32 available replicas, of
which one replica has failed.
We use Figures 9(i) and 9(j) to illustrate, for each con-
sensus protocol, the throughput and average latency attained
by the system. For each protocol, increasing the batch-size
also increases throughput, while decreasing the latency. This
happens as larger batch-sizes require fewer consensus rounds
to complete the exact same set of requests, reducing the cost
of ordering and executing the transactions. This not only im-
proves throughput, but also reduces client latencies as clients
receive faster responses for their requests. Although increasing
the batch-size reduces the consensus rounds, the large message
size causes a proportional decrease in throughput (or increase
in latency). This is evident from the experiments at higher
batch-sizes: increasing the batch-size beyond 100 gradually
curves the throughput plots towards x-axis for POE, PBFT and
SBFT. For example, on increasing the batch size from 100 to
400, POE and PBFT see an increase in throughput by 60% and
80%, respectively, while the gap in throughput reduces from
43% to 25%. As in the previous experiments, ZYZZYVA yields
a significantly lower throughput as it cannot handle failures.
In case of HOTSTUFF, an increase in batch size does increases
its throughput but due to high scaling of the graph this change
seems insignificant.
G. Disabling Out-of-Ordering
Until now, we allowed protocols like PBFT, POE, SBFT and
ZYZZYVA to process requests out-of-order. As a result, these
protocols achieve massively high throughputs in comparison
to HOTSTUFF, which is restricted by its model of sequential
consensus processing. In Figures 9(k) and 9(l), we evaluate the
performance of these protocols when there are no opportunities
for out-of-ordering.
In this setting, we require each client to only send its
request when it has accepted a response for its previous
query. As HOTSTUFF pipelines its phases of consensus into
a four-phase pipeline, so we allow it to access four client
requests (each on a distinct subsequent replica) at any time.
As expected, HOTSTUFF performs better than all the other
protocols at the expense of a higher latency as it rotates leader
at the end of each consensus, which allows it to pipeline
four requests. However, notice that once out-of-ordering is
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Fig. 10: Throughput of POE and PBFT under instance failures (n =
32). (a) replicas detect failure of primary and broadcast VC-REQUEST;
(b) replicas receives VC-REQUEST from others; (c) replicas receives
NV-PROPOSE from new primary; (d) state recovery;
disabled, throughput drops from 200 k transactions/s to just
under a few thousand transactions per second. Hence, from the
practical standpoint, out-of-ordering is simply crucial. Further,
the difference in latency of different protocols is quite small,
and the visible variation is a result of graph scaling while the
actual numbers are in the range of 20− 40 milliseconds.
H. Primary Failure–View Change
We now measure the throughputs attained by POE and PBFT
in case of a benign primary failure. For our experiments, we let
the primary replica to complete consensus for around a million
transactions or 10s and then fail. This causes clients to timeout
while waiting for responses for their pending transactions.
Hence, these clients forward their requests to backup replicas.
When a backup replica receives a client request, it forwards
that request to the primary and waits on a timer. Once a
replicas timeouts, it detects a primary failure and broadcasts a
VC-REQUEST message to all the other replicas—initiate view-
change protocol (a). Next, each replica waits for a new view
message from the next primary. In the meantime, a replica
may receive VC-REQUEST messages from other replicas (b).
Once a replica receives NV-PROPOSE message from the new
primary (c), it moves to the next view.
In Figure 10, we illustrate the impact of a view-change on
POE and PBFT protocols. We skip illustrating view-change
plots for ZYZZYVA and SBFT as they already face severe
reduction in throughput for a single backup failures. Further,
ZYZZYVA has an unsafe view-change algorithm and SBFT’s
view-change algorithm is no less expensive than PBFT. For
HOTSTUFF, we do not show results as it changes primary at
the end of every consensus. Although single primary protocols
face a momentary loss in throughput during view-change,
these protocols easily cover this gap through their ability to
process messages out-of-order.
I. Simulating BFT Protocols
To further underline that the message delay and not band-
width requirements becomes a determining factor in the
throughput of protocols in which the primary does not propose
requests out-of-order, we performed a separate simulation of
the maximum performance of POE, PBFT, and HOTSTUFF.
The simulation makes 500 consensus decisions and processes
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Fig. 11: The simulated number of consensus decisions POE,
PBFT, and HOTSTUFF can make as a function of the latency.
Only the protocols in the right-most plot and marked with ∗
process requests out-of-order processing.
all message send and receive steps, but delays the arrival of
messages by a pre-determined message delay. The simulation
skips any expensive computations and, hence, the simulated
performance is entirely determined by the cost of message
exchanges. We ran the simulation with n ∈ {4, 16, 128}
replicas, for which the results can be found in Figure 11, first
three plots. As one can see, if bandwidth is not a limiting
factor, then the performance of protocols that do not propose
requests out-of-order will be determined by the number of
communication rounds and the message delay. As both PBFT
and POE have one communication round more than the two
rounds of HOTSTUFF, their performance is roughly two-thirds
that of HOTSTUFF, this independent of the number of replicas
or the message delay. Furthermore, doubling message delay
will roughly half performance. Finally, we also measured the
maximum performance of protocols that do allow out-of-order
processing of up to 250 consensus decisions. These results can
be found in Figure 11, last plot. As these results show, out-of-
order processing increases performance by a factor of roughly
200, even with 128 replicas.
V. RELATED WORK
Generally speaking, agreement aand consensus are age-old
problems that received much theoretical and practical attention
(see, e.g., [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34]). Further,
the approach of reverting decisions and redoing another trans-
actions is a common problem in distributed systems. Raft [28]
also proposed the idea of re-writing the log a replica by the
leader. However, this approach delegates too much power in
the hands of a leader, which could make a byzantine-resistant
system unsafe when the leader is malicious.
The interest in practical BFT consensus protocols took
off with the introduction of PBFT [1]. Apart from the pro-
tocols that we already evaluated, there are some interest-
ing protocols that achieve efficient consensus by requiring
5f +1 replicas [35], [36]. However, these protocols have been
shown to work only in the cases where transactions are non-
conflicting [2]. Some other BFT protocols [37], [38] suggest
the use of trusted components to reduce the cost of BFT con-
sensus. These works require only 2f+1 replicas as the trusted
component helps to guarantee a correct ordering. The safety
of these protocols relies on the security of trusted component.
In comparison, POE does not: (i) require extra replicas, (ii)
depend on clients, (iii) require trusted components, and (iv)
does not need two phases of quadratic communication required
by PBFT.
As a promising future direction, Castro [20] also suggested
exploring speculative optimizations for PBFT, which he re-
ferred to as tentative execution. However, this lacked: (i)
formal description, (ii) non-divergence safety property, (iii)
specification of rollback under attacks, (iv) re-examination of
the view change protocol, and (v) any actual evaluation.
Consensus for Blockchain: Since the introduction to Bit-
coin [39], the well-known cryptocurrency that led to the coin-
ing of term blockchain, several new BFT protocols that cater to
cryptocurrencies have been designed [40], [41]. Bitcoin [39]
employs the Proof-of-Work [40] consensus algorithm (POW),
which is computationally intensive, achieves low throughput
and can cause forks (divergence) in the blockchain: separate
chains can exist on non-faulty replicas, which in turn can cause
double-spending attacks [21]. Due to these limitations, several
other similar algorithms have been proposed. Proof-of-Stake
(PoS) [41] states that any replica owning n% of the total
resources gets n% times opportunity to create new blocks.
As PoS is resource driven, it can face attacks where replicas
are incentivized to work simultaneously on several forks of
the blokchain, without ever trying to eliminate these forks.
There are also a set of interesting alternative designs such as
ConFlux [42], Caper [8] and MeshCash [43] that suggest the
use of directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to store a blockchain to
improve the performance of Bitcoin. However, these protocols
either rely on POW or PBFT for consensus.
Protocols like Algorand [44] employ probabilistic estimates
to achieve fast consensus. In the worse case, Algorand can
create forks and is susceptible to nothing-at-stake attack [45].
Similarly, there are interesting works that suggest rotating
leaders, such as HOTSTUFF and TenderMint [46]. Although
these protocols reduce the cost of view-change, they inhibit
implicit parallelism. Meta-protocols such as MultiBFT [47],
[17] and RBFT [6] run multiple PBFT consensuses in parallel.
These protocols also aim at removing dependence on the
consensus led by a single primary. POE does not face the
limitations faced by POW [40] and PoS [41]. The use of
DAGs [42], [43], and sharding [8], [18], [45] is orthogonal to
the design of POE. Hence, their use with POE can reap further
benefits. Further, POE can be employed by meta-protocols.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We present Proof-of-Execution (POE), a novel Byzantine
fault-tolerant consensus protocol that guarantees safety and
liveness and does so in only three linear phases. POE decou-
ples ordering from execution by allowing replicas to process
messages out-of-order and execute client-transactions specu-
latively. Despite these properties, POE ensures that all the
replicas reach a single unique order for all the transactions.
Further, POE guarantees that if a client observes identical
results of execution from a majority of the replicas, then it
can reliably mark its transaction committed. Due to speculative
execution, POE may require replicas to revert executed trans-
actions, however. To evaluate POE’s design, we implement it
in our RESILIENTDB fabric and show that POE achieves up
to 80% more throughput than existing BFT protocols.
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APPENDIX
A. Designing POE using Message Authentication Codes
Consider a view v with primary P and a client c that
wants execution of a transaction T . In POE, the client c
initiates execution by sending T to P. To assure that malicious
primaries cannot forge transactions, the client signs T with
its private key. We denote such signed messages by 〈T 〉c. To
initiate replication and execution of T as the k-th transaction,
the primary proposes T to all replicas by broadcasting the
message PROPOSE(〈T 〉c, v, k).
After a replica R receives a PROPOSE message from P,
it checks whether at least nf ≥ 2f + 1 other replicas also
received the same proposal from P. This check assures R that
at least nf − f ≥ f + 1 non-faulty replicas received the same
proposal, which helps to achieve speculative non-divergence.
To perform this check, each replica agrees to support the first
proposal PROPOSE(〈T 〉c, v, k) it receives from the primary
by broadcasting a message SUPPORT(D(〈T 〉c), v, k) to all
replicas. The replica R also logs this support decision as
SupportR(〈T 〉c, k, v).
After this broadcast, each replica waits until it receives
SUPPORT messages, identical to the message it sent, from nf
distinct replicas. If R receives these messages, it view-commits
to T as the k-th transaction in view v. The replica R logs this
view-commit decision as VCommitR(〈T 〉c, k, v).
After R view-commits to T , R schedules T for speculative
execution as the k-th transaction of view v. Consequently,
T will be executed by R after all preceding transactions
are executed. We write ExecuteR(〈T 〉c, k, v) to denote this
execution. After execution, R informs the client of the order
of execution and of any execution result r via a message
INFORM(D(〈T 〉c), v, k, r).
A client considers its transaction successfully executed after
it receives identical INFORM(D(〈T 〉c), v, k, r) messages from
nf distinct replicas. This guarantees that at least nf−f ≥ f+1
non-faulty replicas executed this transaction as the k-th trans-
action. Hence, POE’s speculative non-divergence guarantees
that eventually all non-faulty replicas will accept and execute
T as the k-th transaction.
